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Copyright and Truth
Maurizio Borghi*
This Article calls into question the primary meaning of copyright
law. It argues that copyright is not primarily a legal instrument,
but rather a fundamental mode of human existence. The starting
point of the analysis is Kant’s definition of a book as a "public
address" and of author’s rights as ultimately being grounded in the
furtherance and maintenance of truth. Building on Kant’s argument,
the Article defines the copyright primary subject matter as the act of
speaking publicly in one’s own name, and the copyright sphere as the
author-public coalescence that such act of speaking generates. This
enables reaching a proper understanding of the scope of copyright
and to characterizing its specificity as compared to its "fellow rights,"
patents and trademarks.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright is often represented as a tool for regulating an intrinsically
conflicting field. In the "copyright arena," so runs the account in the current
discourse, multiple actors struggle to adjudicate as much control as possible
over valuable resources such as information, knowledge or, briefly, culture.
As a consequence, copyright is seen as a means of "striking a balance"
between a potentially fatal clash of interests — broadly, the interests of
"the owners" versus those of "the users," or, in more classical terms,
the interests of the author as opposed to those of the public at large.1
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1 For a thorough critique of the notion of "balance," see Abraham Drassinower, From
Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in Copyright Law,
34 J. CORP. L. 991 (2009).
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We may call this view of copyright the clash-and-balance paradigm.2 Such
a paradigm normally expresses itself in binary language: owners v. users,
property v. commons, exclusivity v. public domain, etc. The most popular
narrative attached to this paradigm is that of a "free culture" whose potential
is threatened and diminished by the many barriers that the current copyright
regime allows to be erected. In other words: copyright law, as it now stands,
is no longer capable of performing its function of balance.3 The most relevant
consequence of the predominance of this paradigm is that the copyright debate
of recent years has been focused almost exclusively on the scope of copyright
— more precisely, on how to limit the scope of author’s rights of exclusion
by increasing the weight of the opposite side of the scale in the balance.
Little attention has been paid to what copyright itself is about, that is to
its "what-about," as if, as Abraham Drassinower has rightly pointed out,
the question of the subject matter of copyright was not the preliminary and
most important one in this debate.4
It is not my intention to minimize the problems connected with an
over-expanded copyright regime and its notorious downsides. The fact that
copyright law has expanded over time is indisputable.5 Equally indisputable is
the fact that the current copyright system is in crisis and it is increasingly being
perceived as losing credibility and legitimacy.6 My question is whether the
legitimate boundaries of copyright can be sufficiently determined through the
lenses of the clash-and-balance paradigm, or whether a closer consideration
of the "what- about" of copyright is needed for this purpose. Is such an
2 This paradigm underlies many of the current criticisms of the so-called neoclassicist
economic approach to copyright, which justifies a broad proprietary regime over
creative expression. For a critical review of both the neoclassicist approach and
the criticisms thereof, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 306-40 (1996). See also, for a critique of
the neoclassicist view of copyright as "incentive," Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. XXX (2011).
3 See, for example, almost anything written by Lawrence Lessig.
4 Drassinower, supra note 1, at 992-93 (arguing that subject matter issues are
more important than scope issues when determining the public domain). On the
importance of the subject matter issue compare also Brad Sherman, What Is a
Work?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. XXX (2011).
5 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in
6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2008).
6 Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165 (2008).
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investigation fated to be set aside as redundant in the face of the "obvious"
consideration that copyright is just about balancing clashing interests?
As a matter of fact, some scholars have looked at copyright from
perspectives that, albeit not always explicitly, call into question elements
which cannot be simplistically reduced to interests in conflict. In various
ways, these perspectives raise the awareness that copyright primarily, and
not just secondarily, refers to a dimension that goes beyond any particular
or even "general" interest. Copyright involves (as some have pointed out)
matters such as democracy, a communicative sphere, or an ongoing dialogue
between human beings.7 What all these different approaches have in common
is that they overcome the binary language of the dominating paradigm and
draw attention to a third and higher instance which is at stake in copyright.
In this Article I argue that this third and higher instance, which is implicitly
evoked by concepts like democracy, communication and dialogue, is better
captured by upfront reference to truth. Kant’s notion of an author’s work
as the act of speaking to the public, and the fundamental legal principles
that arise from this elemental notion, represent the basis of my attempt to
understand copyright as being grounded in the most fundamental need that
human beings share when living in community with others, namely, the
need for truth.
In Part I I consider Kant’s argument on the wrongfulness of reprinting,
with the aim of arriving at a suitable definition of copyright subject matter.
In Part II I analyze the intimate link between the subject matter of copyright
and truth, and clarify what truth is in this context. The reflection developed
by Hannah Arendt in the essay Truth and Politics will be of guidance in
my analysis. In Part III I attempt to outline the specificity of copyright
by comparing its own way of relating to truth with that of other so-called
intellectual property rights, namely patents and trademarks. I conclude with
some provisional remarks on the legitimate scope of copyright.
7 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 2 (pointing out that copyright is primarily about
enhancing the democratic character of civil society); Michael D. Birnhack, More or
Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION 59
(Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault eds., 2005) (focusing on the copyright-public
domain interplay as crucial in constructing a "communicative sphere"); Drassinower,
supra note 1 (explicitly questioning the concept of "balance" and arguing that
"dialogue" is a more appropriate metaphor to structure the interpretation of copyright
law and its purpose).
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I. RECONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT:
ACTIONS AND NOT THINGS
As is known, Kant’s argument on the wrongfulness of unauthorized
reprinting of books relies on the notion of a book as a speech to the
public.8 In Kant’s terms, a book is "a writing which represents a speech that
someone, through visible signs of language, holds before the public."9 The
one in the name of which the speech is delivered is the author, and the one
who speaks in the name of the author is the publisher. The author, thus, speaks
through the publisher to the public, and the publisher is entitled to act as
intermediary between the author and the public only "in virtue of a mandate
(mandatum) that the author gives to him to that effect."10 The unauthorized
reprinter also speaks in the name of the author, but he does so without having
a mandate to that effect. Nor can this permission to speak in the author’s name
8 Kant addressed the issue of unauthorized reprint in the 1785 essay On the
Unlawfulness of Book Reprinting. See Immanuel Kant, On the Unlawfulness of
Reprinting (1875), reprinted in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900) (Lionel
Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org (search
"On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting"; then follow hyperlink) [hereinafter Kant,
On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting]. The issue was then further addressed in
the Doctrine of Right, published in 1797. See IMMANUEL KANT, Die Metaphysik
der Sitten. Rechtslehre [The Metaphysics of Morals. Doctrine of Right], in 8
WERKAUSGABE IMMANUEL KANT 404 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1968) [hereinafter
Kant, Doctrine of Right] (discussion under heading "What Is a Book?"). The
Kantian doctrine on book reprinting is mentioned in many leading commentaries of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both in Germany and in other countries, but
only a few jurists have tried to develop it and, overall, it has had almost no influence
on the dominating copyright discourse. See Friedemann Kawohl, Commentary on
Kant’s Essay On the Injustice of Reprinting Books (1785), in Primary Sources on
Copyright (1450-1900), supra (search "On the Injustice of Reprinting"; then follow
"commentary" hyperlink). The Kantian argument has been recently reconsidered
in the light of the contemporary debate on copyright. See, in particular, Abraham
Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3 (2003); Abraham Drassinower, Authorship
as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright vis-a`-vis Patent and Trade-Mark,
1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1999 (2008); Netanel, supra note 5, at 29-33; Leslie K. Treiger-
Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059 (2008).
9 Kant, Doctrine of Right, supra note 8, at 404.
10 Id. at 404. Kant denotes the publisher as the one who "provides in his own name
[nothing but] the mute instrument for the delivery of an author’s speech to the
public." Kant, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, supra note 8, at 407 (emphasis
added).
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be deduced from the fact that, because the book has been published, one can
legitimately possess a copy thereof: the mere possession of a thing can never
entail a positive right to demand from a person (the author) that he is obliged
to act in some way (speaking to the public).11 Therefore, the unauthorized
reprinter speaks to the public either in virtue of an intrusion into another’s
business, or by presumptuously forcing someone to perform an act against his
will. As a consequence he commits a twofold wrong: against the legitimate
publisher, as he deprives him of the profits he could have derived from the
execution of the author’s mandate; and against the author himself — since he
undertakes a business in his name (namely, speaking to the public) without
and against his consent.12
Pivotal to Kant’s argument is identifying the mandate as the contractual
form which characterizes the dealings between the author and the publisher.
What is, in essence, a mandatum? As an institution of Roman contract law,
mandatum regulates the relationship between individuals as far as actions
to be carried out — rather than things to be exchanged or works to be
performed — are concerned.13 In the traditional terminology it is a "perfect
contract," in the sense that it is concluded in itself by the carrying out of the
entrusted action, without the need to be completed by further deeds, such as
an act of payment.14 The subject of this ideal contract between author and
11 Kant, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, supra note 8, at 407-08.
12 Copyright lawyers may regard such a twofold wrong as corresponding to the
well known distinction between "economic" and "moral" rights. However, it is
worth noting that, in Kant’s argument, the alleged economic right is essentially a
publisher’s right that arises only as a consequence of the author’s mandate, and it is
very limited in scope: on the one hand, it does not extend to acts other than those
necessary to deliver the author’s own words, see infra note 20; on the other hand, it
is not necessarily an exclusive right. As Kant puts it, the "right of publication" (i.e.,
reproduction and distribution) is an exclusive right only insofar as "the competition
of others in his business would effectively render the conduct of [the author’s
mandate] impossible for him." Kant, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, supra note
8, at 414-15. This means that the reason for the publication right being exclusive is
purely contingent.
13 Mandatum is distinct from both locatio operarum (contract for work to be done)
and emptio-venditio (purchase and sale). Cf. ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW at 452, 567, 574 (1953) (entries Emptio venditio,
Locatio conductio operarum and Mandatum).
14 Typically a mandatum is based on the trust (fides) of the two counterparts, and
it may — but does not have to — be followed by a grateful reward in the
form of an honorarium. The main characteristic of the honorarium compared to
other forms of payment (such as the pretium and the merces, which correspond
respectively to contracts of emptio-venditio and locatio operarum) is that it has no
relationship of equivalence with the action entrusted. In other words, an entrusted
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publisher is not a "thing" (for instance, an "immaterial thing" such as a text
as fixed in the manuscript to be reproduced in copies) or a "work" (such as an
"intellectual work" performed by the author), but rather an action — namely,
the act of speaking to the public in one’s own name.15 What the publisher
actually tells the public is the following: "Through me a writer is having
this or that brought to your attention, for your information, etc. I answer
for nothing, not even for the liberty which he is taking in speaking publicly
through me; I am just the mediator of this reaching to you."16
This notion of the subject matter of the author-publisher contract as
an action deserves some further comments. In a way, it clashes with the
common understanding of the work, as subject matter of copyright, as being
primarily a good — be it immaterial, intangible, or even "spiritual." This
common understanding is not entirely wrong. It is not wrong, in the sense
that from a certain point of view such subject matter is comparable to any
other good capable of being used as a means of exchange. In particular,
a work in the form of book is prima facie akin to money: it circulates
from hand to hand and serves as a universal means of exchange. As Kant
himself puts it in the Doctrine of Right, money is the concept of the most
powerful and useful means by which people reciprocally exchange "the fruits
of their labor";17 similarly, a book is the concept of "the greatest reciprocal
exchange of thoughts."18 Yet if we look at these two means of exchange from
a purely legal perspective, particularly from the perspective of the rights that
can be contractually derived from their use, a landmark difference surfaces:
money serves for any transfer of properties, insofar as by means of money
any contract of purchase and sale (emptio-venditio) can be concluded. By
contrast, a book can never serve a purchase-and-sale relationship.19 The
action cannot be "valued" as an exchangeable thing or a work done. Hence the
difference between opus (work) and opera (act). Cf. BERGER, supra note 13, at
488, 581, 649 (entries Honorarium, Merces and Pretium). For a discussion of these
relationships, see Maurizio Borghi, Rewarding Creativity: In Law, Economics and
Literature, 1 ANCILLA IURIS 54 (2006).
15 Kant, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting, supra note 8, at 407 n.? ("[T]he essential
point that it is not a thing which is thereby delivered, but an act [opera], namely a
speech, and, what is more, literally.").
16 Id. at 406.
17 Kant, Doctrine of Right, supra note 8, at 401.
18 Id. at 400.
19 Apart from the purchase of copies thereof. Yet, as we have seen, possession of a
copy does not trigger any right over the book itself — more precisely, over the
action that the book entails.
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speech it represents "through visible signs of language" is not transferred as a
form of property from an original owner to an intermediary and eventually to
a purchaser, but is entrusted to the intermediary as a duty to be accomplished
towards third parties, namely to the public. What is being transferred to the
intermediary by this contract is nothing but a duty (and a faculty) to retell.20
The subject matter of the author-publisher transaction is therefore an
action, and not a thing. Why does this difference matter? Because actions,
unlike things, cannot be divorced from the aim and purpose they are
directed to and for which they have been entrusted to others. Actions have
necessarily a purpose or an end.21 By contrast, things can be regarded as
having no "why" and end, and this, in principle, does not affect their legal
significance. For example, a piece of land or a piece of information, as things,
can be considered as objects of certain rights regardless of the purpose or end
(if any) for which they have been transferred from one owner to another. The
same is not generally valid for actions. Actions are in themselves inseparable
from their own purpose or end, and this does affect the possibility of their
being entrusted to others and the way in which they are entrusted.
If this is true, then the question arises regarding what is the end of
an act such as speaking publicly in one’s name. We are asking here for
a presumptive end, namely an end which can be reasonably expected in
20 Retelling has here the literal sense of reiterating the speech in the author’s own
words by means of an appropriate instrument (a "mute instrument," see discussion
supra note 10). This contract cannot extend to non-literal retelling, since a mandate
to speak to the public in the author’s name but in someone else’s words would
be contradictory. As Kant himself states, abridgements, translations and, generally,
reworking of an author’s work do not qualify as reprint, and are therefore permitted:
"For here it is another author who is conducting through his publisher a different
business to that of the first author, and this other author is therefore not encroaching
in the latter’s business with the public." Kant, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting,
supra note 8, at 417 (emphasis added); cf. Treiger-Bar-Am, supra note 8.
21 As Hannah Arendt puts it:
Action needs a deliberate planning ahead, for which Aristotle coins a new
term, proairesis, choice in the sense of preference between alternatives —
one rather than another. . . . The faculty of choice is necessary whenever
men act for a purpose (heneka tinos), insofar as means have to be chosen,
but the purpose itself, the ultimate end of the act for the sake of which it was
embarked on in the first place, is not open to choice.
2 HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 60-61 (1978). As we shall see in the
following, the purpose of the act of speaking publicly in one’s own name is not
open to choice, and this very fact makes possible the speakers’ faculty of choice (or,
in other words, their freedom of speech).
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advance, prior to any contingent embodiment of the act — that is, regardless
of the contingent purpose of each individual act of speaking. Is there any
such end?
A. Action — To What End?
In traditional copyright discourse, and particularly in that of continental
Europe, the statement is often made that copyright ultimately serves to
assure the author’s autonomy in self- expression, or the author’s liberty to
express his own "personality" in writing or in any other material form. In
this view, authors do primarily "express" themselves or their personality
in their works.22 Accordingly, we could say that the presumptive end of any
act of speaking publicly in one’s own name is self-expression. But can we be
satisfied with this assumption?
Not really. As a matter of fact, the idea of expressing oneself just highlights
an outward trait of the said act. To be sure, every act of speaking is in a way
"expressing," but this obvious consideration leaves completely unanswered
the question why one’s expressions should be addressed to and shared with
others. It is at least questionable whether the idea of self-expression as such
is of any guidance when dealing with issues touching on the very nature
of authorship.23 As a matter of fact, even assuming that the author expresses
22 For a critique of this paradigm (and of the opposite "marketplace" paradigm as well),
see Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace
and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
159, 178-82 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (discussion under heading
"Do Authors Express Themselves?").
23 In a similar vein, but referring more generally to the common understating of
works of art and of art as such as a "form of expression," Martin Heidegger
observes that "the characterization of art as expression is not incorrect. Such a
view is as undeniable as the sentence which says: motorcycle is an object which
produces noise. Every technician would burst out laughing before such a definition
of what this mechanical contrivance is. Yet nobody is laughing at the fact that,
for very long time, we’ve been talking nonsense on art as ‘expression.’" MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. Erste Ausarbeitung [1931/32] [On
the Origin of Work of Art. First Draft], in 5 HEIDEGGER STUDIES 5, 17, (1989).
For an example of such talking nonsense in legal discourse, see the text of
the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, in particular its curious circular
speaking: art. 1(a) "[The objective of this Convention is] to protect and promote
the diversity of cultural expressions," and art. 4(1) (Definition of cultural diversity)
"’Cultural diversity’ refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups
and societies find expression." Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, arts. 1(a), 4(1), Oct. 20, 2005, available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf (emphases added). For
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himself publicly, it remains unclear why the public should have an interest
in coming to know the author’s self or personality. Therefore, the question
remains: to what end does the author need to speak publicly?
As we shall see, Kant’s philosophy is not elusive on this point. The
following two subsections look more closely into this issue, by considering
separately the two elements of the act which constitute the subject matter
of the author-public relation mediated by the publisher, namely the act of
speaking publicly in one’s own name. The remaining part of the Article tries
to draw some consequences from this reading.
B. Speaking Publicly
We have previously mentioned a difference between money, as a means to
exchange goods, and books, as a means to exchange and circulate thoughts.
We can now point out a further, more essential, difference between thoughts
and goods in general, including so-called intangible goods. The relationship
between thought and its public communication is not something extrinsic
like that between goods and their circulation. A good, a commodity, remains
the same regardless of whether it circulates or not. It can lie unemployed
in a warehouse or stored in a database, and this does not alter its nature.
By contrast, thoughts — contrary to what is commonly assumed — cannot
be what they ought to be in the absence of communication. Thinking is
somehow intrinsically public, and this in two senses: firstly, thinking itself
has immediately to do with something in which all humankind is likely to
have an interest, and it is never a private affair — even when the act of
thinking is carried out privately or in solitude. Secondly, and consequently,
thinking is not fully accomplished unless it is publicly communicated, that
is to say until it is shared with other men. This last point is clearly addressed
by Kant in a celebrated paragraph of the 1786 article What Does It Mean to
Orient Oneself in Thinking?:
It is often said that a superior power can deprive us of the freedom
to speak or to write, but not of the freedom to think. But how much
and how correctly would we think, if we didn’t think, so to say,
"in common" with others, to whom we communicate our thoughts
and who communicate theirs to us? Thus one can really say that the
a critical analysis, see Fiona Macmillan, Copyright, the World Trade Organization,
and Cultural Self-Determination, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW, supra
note 5, at 307.
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external power that deprives men of the freedom to communicate their
thoughts publicly, also deprives them of their freedom to think, that
is, the only treasure left us in the midst of social impositions, the only
means which can still permit us to find remedies for the ills of our
condition.24
A power which limits the freedom of communicating publicly also
prejudices the possibility of thinking itself. Why is that so? It is because
thinking is essentially, and not just afterwards or occasionally, thinking-in-
common with others.
In Kantian terms, thinking means essentially judging.25 Judging, in turn,
means connecting; namely connecting a predicate (P) with a subject (S) in
a proposition (whose general form is: S is P). Now, judging (connecting) is
certainly an operation that each human being can perform individually. But
precisely in this act of connecting, the human being necessarily relies on
something external to himself, namely on the matter to which the proposition
refers. In Kantian terms, every judgment is based on "the necessary unity,"
in view of which the judgment is carried out.26 In this sense, precisely in
the individual act of judgment each individual is de-individualized — he goes
beyond himself and heads towards something other. The most immediate form
of this being-by-otherness is being with other human beings. This is why it is
so necessary to have one’s own thoughts (judgments) tested by other thinking
(judging) beings.
Now, communication to others is a means — even though only subjective
— of testing the correctness of one’s own judgment (i.e., its accordance
with the object) through its accordance with the others’ judgments (which,
if the judgment is correct, will also be in accordance with the same object):
For in this case [not the certainty, but] the presumption, at least, arises
24 Immanuel Kant, Was heißt, sich im Denken orientieren? [What Does It Mean, to
Orient One’s Self in Thinking?], in 5 WERKAUSGABE IMMANUEL KANT, supra note
8, at 267, 280.
25 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason], in 3
WERKAUSGABE IMMANUEL KANT, supra note 8, at A 59, B 84: "[W]e can reduce
all acts of understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be represented as
the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of
thought." We cannot here question the scope and legitimacy of this understanding
of thinking as judgment. For the sake of this analysis it is sufficient to observe that
this understanding is intimately related to a corresponding understanding of truth as
"correctness."
26 The concept of such unity is the "category." The ways of connecting, i.e., of unifying,
are deduced from the traditional table of judgments. Id. at A 70, B 95.
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that the agreement of all judgments with each other, in spite of the
different characters of the subjects, rests upon the common ground of
the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the
judgment is established.27
In the Anthropology Kant maintains the same principle, and he explicitly
relates it to the freedom of the press:
It is so certain that we cannot give up this means [consisting in
submitting one’s own judgment to the others’ intellect] to assure
ourselves of the truth of our own judgment, that this is perhaps the
principal reason why learned people fight so hard for the freedom of
the press. If this freedom is denied, we would thereby lose a very
potent means for proving the correctness of our own judgments and
we would be left to error.28
The freedom of the press, that is the freedom of addressing one’s own
thoughts to the whole reading world: is an essential condition for thinking.
Thinking, in turn, is the only way human beings have to be free from error,
that is, to be in the truth.
We may conclude that the presumptive end of every act of speaking
publicly is not an undetermined "self-expression" or the manifestation of
one’s own personality,29 but rather the furtherance and maintenance of truth.
Yet why does this act necessarily entail speaking in one’s own name?
C. Speaking in One’s Own Name
Speaking publicly is justified as it is the precondition for the full deployment
of thinking, which in turn is the way in which humans can distinguish truth
from error. But such speaking in public is also qualified as speaking in one’s
own name. This qualification is not accidental. It is truth itself that requires
it. It is for truth’s sake that each public address must be in one’s own name.
This point merits further attention.
The distinction between speaking in one’s own name and speaking in someone or
something else’s name mirrors the distinction that Kant draws between "private" and
"public" uses of reason:
27 KANT, supra note 25, at A 821-1, B 848-9.
28 IMMANUEL KANT, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht [Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View], in 12 WERKAUSGABE IMMANUEL KANT, supra note 8, at
BA 7.
29 As T.S. Eliot puts it: "[A poem] is not the expression of personality, but an escape
from personality." Geller, supra note 22, at 180 (quoting Eliot).
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By the public use of one’s reason I mean the use which anyone may make of it as
a man of learning before the whole reading world. Private use I call that which
one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him.30
As an example, a private use is that of a clergyman before his pupils,
whereby he is bound to instruct them in catechism conforming to the doctrine
of the church he serves. Similarly, we may say, a lecturer on copyright law
is bound to instruct his or her students on how the statute law applies to the
relevant cases. Both the lecturer and the clergymen, in those particular tasks
that are entrusted to them, have a duty to instruct pupils and students on
existing norms and doctrines and to educate them accordingly. They enjoy
no freedom to revise and amend the respective doctrine at their will, since
they do not speak in their own person, but in the name of the discipline
they respectively serve. Yet both the clergymen and the lecturer, as men of
learning, have not only the complete freedom, but also the duty, to impart
to the public at large all their criticisms and thoughts on mistaken aspects
(if any) of their respective doctrines. These two manners of making use of
one’s own reason can coexist, and normally do, but must never be confused
with each other.31 It is only in the latter, the public use of reason that men
enjoy unrestricted freedom to speak in their own person:
Thus an appointed teacher’s use of his reason for the sake of
his congregation is merely private, because, however large the
congregation is, this use is always only domestic; in this regard,
as a priest, he is not free and cannot be such because he is acting
under instructions from someone else. By contrast, the cleric — as
a man of learning who speaks through his writings to the public as
such, i.e., the world at large — enjoys in this public use of reason an
unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to speak
his own person.32
30 Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufkla¨rung? [Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment?], in 11 WERKAUSGABE IMMANUEL KANT, supra
note 8, at 53, 55. For a discussion of the concept of public use of reason, see
Maurizio Borghi, The Public Use of Reason: A Philosophical Understanding of
Knowledge Sharing, 3 INT’L J. HUMAN. 179 (2006).
31 An example of confusion between the private and public use of reason is when a
lecturer uses his or her position to address ideological sermons to students. Another
example is when a scholar covertly promotes some lobby’s interests in a scientific
article. Although the distinction between the private and public use of reason is (in
theory) clear-cut, it fatally tends to become confused when it comes to practice.
32 Kant, supra note 30, at 56.
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The furtherance of truth requires that men not be bound by any
externally entrusted obligations. The trait of publicity which characterizes
this unrestricted and properly free use of reason is not purely empirical. In
other words, a use of one’s own reason does not qualify as public in virtue
of the great number of people which may factually or potentially be reached
by the speech. "Public" and "private" are here qualitative, not quantitative,
concepts.
What singles out speaking in one’s own name is primarily the freedom
that the speaker takes in addressing his speech to the public. Any act of free
speech is a speaking in one’s own name, and vice versa. Once a word in
one’s own name is addressed to other men, it becomes eventually visible in
its double status as the author’s own word and as a word addressed to every
single human being, namely addressed to all men who have an interest in it,
and from then on it can start to be experienced as such.
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE COPYRIGHT SPHERE: TRUTH AND
COALESCENCE
The subject matter of the contract between author and publisher is an
act, namely the act of speaking publicly in the author’s name. This act
is presumptively aimed at the furtherance of truth. To be sure, an act of
speaking can be aimed at ends that have nothing to do with truth, such
as opinion as such, leisure or just entertainment. A speech can even be
aimed at promoting untruth or deliberate falsehood. However, it is precisely
against the background of this likelihood — namely, of being distracted by
mere opinion or entertainment, or even being captured in untruth — that
the furtherance of truth gains its clear stance.33 From this point of view, the
freedom of speaking in one’s own name includes the freedom of amending,
33 The fact that in copyright law any work has equal status independently from the
"content" it delivers is metaphysically grounded in this relationship to truth. It is only
in a utilitarian approach, where copyright is a means to incentivize "progress," that
works may be considered differently according to their content. See Zimmermann,
supra note 2.
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denying and even invalidating anyone else’s speech.34 This freedom can only
be sufficiently determined for truth’s sake.
It appears that the act of speaking publicly in one’s own name cannot be
comprehended as an isolated act of communication, but must be necessarily
considered as designing a field — namely a filed in which nothing but truth
itself is at stake. Yet what is truth?
A. Rational Truth, Factual Truth, Reliance
In this analysis we cannot afford a thorough investigation of the essence
of truth and will therefore take the word initially in the sense in which it
is commonly understood. Such a common understanding in turn depends
on the traditional meaning of truth, a meaning that Kant himself shares.
For Kant, as for all modern metaphysical thinking, truth is, formally, the
agreement of one’s judgment with the relevant object. "True" is a judgment
which is in accordance with the facts or with reason; "false" is a judgment
which is not in accordance with the facts or with reason.35 A corollary of this
traditional understanding is that there is factual truth as distinguished from
rational truth.
Although we cannot question here the scope and legitimacy of this
understanding, we must place the issue in its appropriate context. To that
end, we shall refer to the analysis developed by Hannah Arendt in her essay
Truth and Politics.36
As Arendt puts it, examples of rational truths are "the three angles of a
triangle should be equal to two angles of a square" or "it is better to suffer
wrong than to do wrong"; an example of factual truth is "Germany invaded
34 This inalienable freedom justifies limitations to the scope of copyright, such as
expressed by the doctrine of fair dealing for purposes of criticism or review, cf.
Drassinower, supra note 1, at 1004-05, or resulting from the so-called idea/expression
dichotomy, as firstly elaborated by Fichte in the 1793 essay Proof of the Unlawfulness
of Reprinting. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting
(1793), reprinted in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), supra note 8
(search "Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting"; then follow hyperlink). For a
detailed analysis of Fichte’s argument, see Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, Sharing
Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital Environment, in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS
IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007).
35 KANT, supra note 25, at A 58, B 82; see also id. at A 489, B 517.
36 HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 223-59 (Penguin Books 2006)
(1961).
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Belgium in 1914."37 Both rational and factual truths are distinguished, in turn,
from opinion.38
Traditionally, the opposition between truth and opinion affects mainly
the so-called rational truth. However, as Hannah Arendt acutely observes,
facts and events are "infinitely more fragile things than axioms, discoveries,
theories," since they belong to the ever- changing field of affairs of men,
and once they have been removed from the shared memory — either as a
consequence of negligence or as an effect of deliberate maneuver — "no
rational effort will ever bring them back."39 Rational truth is permanently at
risk of being downgraded to opinion, where it is likely to disappear in the
ever-changing diversity of views, and this is the fate that it almost always
suffers when it is exposed in the marketplace. However, this risk is even
more insidious when it comes to factual truth. Facts are haphazard and their
occurrence does not obey any rational necessity: they could always have
occurred in other ways. Hence, paradoxically, they are even more subject
than axioms and discoveries to being transformed into opinions and, once a
factual truth has been discredited as "just another opinion," it can easily be
stifled as such. A factual truth survives only insofar as it is witnessed and
spoken about. It is "political by nature."40
If that is true, then one might expect that the presumptive end of the
act of speaking publicly in one’s own name is more the furtherance and
maintenance of factual truth than of rational truth. The latter does not
necessarily need to be confirmed by the agreement of others and can be
furthered in solitude. It is not political in nature. It does not need to be
publicly addressed in order to be what it is. It may be communicated to
others, but this act of communication does not affect or change its stance.
To be sure, rational truth is not affected by the agreement or disagreement
of others. However, we cannot conclude on this ground that rational truth
37 Id. at 226. On the capacity of factual truths to survive the onslaught of untruth, in
particular in the form of political lie, Hannah Arendt observes:
It is true, considerably more than the whims of historians would be needed
to eliminate from the record the fact that on the night of August 4, 1914,
German troops crossed the frontiers of Belgium; it would require no less than
a power of monopoly over the entire civilized world. But such a power of
monopoly is far from being inconceivable.
Id. at 235.
38 Id. at 232.
39 Id. at 227.
40 Id. at 234.
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can subsist independently of human togetherness. It is not affected by
others’ judgment — and nevertheless it is still essentially related to human
togetherness as much as factual truth is. As Hannah Arendt clearly puts it:
Rational truth enlightens human understanding, and factual truth must
inform opinions, but these truths, though they are never obscure, are
not transparent either, and it is in their very nature to withstand further
elucidation, as it is in the nature of light to withstand enlightenment.41
By the same token, Kant, when addressing the issue of freedom of the
press,42 warns against the belief that this means of proving the correctness
of our own judgment can be easily waived when it comes to rational
knowledge such as mathematics or philosophy. This is because, although
"in philosophizing we do not need, and we should not need to appeal to the
judgment of others to corroborate our own,"43 the fact that a view which has
been expounded publicly doesn’t find support, may still be a symptom of error.
And from this point of view mathematics itself "is not privileged at all," since
if there was no "perception of the fact that the judgment of the land-surveyor
regularly agreed with the judgment of all the others working diligently and
carefully in the same domain, mathematics itself would not be able to be free
from the fear of falling into error."44
In Hannah Arendt’s terms, rational truth needs elucidation as much as
factual truth needs corroboration. Regardless of whether truth is "rational"
or "factual," a human togetherness is necessarily implied in truth. This
means that there is a trait which belongs to all manners by which truth is
experienced by men, a trait that so-called factual and rational truth have
in common. How can we characterize this trait? The words that Hannah
Arendt uses in conclusion to her essay may provide a precious indication:
"Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it
is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us."45
Truth, as metaphorically ground and sky, is the element on which we,
as human beings, ultimately rely. This trait of reliance is confirmed by the
way in which the English language itself understands the word "truth."46 For
41 Id. at 238.
42 See supra text accompanying note 28.
43 KANT, supra note 28, at A 128-29.
44 Id. at A 129.
45 ARENDT, supra note 36, at 259.
46 "True" comes from the Old-English triewe or treowe, which means "faithful, trusty,
trustworthy," perhaps ultimately from the Indo-European *dru- "tree," on the notion
of "steadfast as an oak," and hence the notion of something to rest upon with
assurance. Compare the entries for "True": True, in Online Etymology Dictionary
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instance, what we call "a true argument" is not primarily an argument which
is factually or rationally correct, but an argument we can rely on. Similarly,
a "true hammer" is not just a hammer which is non-imaginary and "real," but
primarily a hammer we can trustfully rely on when hammering a nail to a wall
or on a floorboard. A "true man" is someone on whose humanity we can rely.
And so forth.
We may term the element that belongs to truth, as far as it is experienced
by man in common with other men, reliance. Any human togetherness is
tied, in one way or another, to truth as reliance. At the same time, truth as
reliance needs human togetherness to be what it is.47
It is necessary now to find a suitable characterization of this element of
togetherness which is essentially implied in truth as reliance.
B. Coalescence
The presumptive end of each act of speaking publicly in one’s own name
is the furtherance and maintenance (elucidation) of a trait which belongs to
all manners by which truth is experienced by men, and that we have termed
(Douglas Harper ed., 2001), http://www.etymonline.com (search "True"; then
follow hyperlink), and True, in OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). This
understanding of truth according to the English mother tongue shines outstandingly
in the following poem of Emily Dickinson:
The Truth — is stirless —
other force — may be presumed to move —
This — then — is best for confidence —
When oldest Cedars swerve —
And Oaks untwist their fists —
And Mountains — feeble — lean —
How excellent a Body, that
Stands without a Bone —
How vigorous a Force
That holds without a Prop —
Truth stays Herself — and every man
That trusts Her — boldly up —
EMILY DICKINSON, The Truth — Is Stirless, in
EMILY DICKINSON — POEMS (PoemHunter.com 2004),
http://www.poemhunter.com/i/ebooks/pdf/emily_dickinson_2004_9.pdf.
47 This constitutive link between truth and men is captured in the last two verses of
Emily Dickinson’s poem. DICKINSON, supra note 46.
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"reliance." This furtherance and maintenance requires freedom of speaking
in one’s own name and liberty of thinking in common with others.
Author and public are not just opposing parties to an act of communication.
Nor do they simply engage in an exchange of informational values. Rather,
author and public are coalescing parties to a common act of thinking. They
coalesce to a common end: the common end of being in the truth.
If thinking is properly thinking in common, then the speaking in
public of which the book is the mute instrument is not just a delivery
of a self-made thought to a self-constituted audience. It is neither the
act through which the author "expresses" his personality, nor the event
owing to which the public may gain "access" to otherwise inaccessible
thoughts. In all these understandings, speaking in public is represented
as an exchange of (informational) values between two self-constituted
poles: it becomes, paradoxically, a private connection between two poles,
represented respectively by the "author" and the "public."48 Speaking in
public is, rather, the act owing to which thinking reaches its full breadth and
achievement as furtherance of truth. It is this latter, the furtherance of truth,
that requires that author and public reach each other in what we may term a
thinking coalescence.49
We can rephrase Kant’s pivotal sentence about the freedom of the press,
which has been quoted above,50 as follows: "But how much and how truly
would we think, if we didn’t think ’in coalescence’ with others, with whom
we coalesce in truth with each other?"
48 The model of copyright as an ideal "contract" between author and public (or between
author and society at large, as is commonly stated) is implicitly grounded in this
misconception of the act of speaking in public. Hence the idea that copyright could
be ultimately replaced by private contracting. For an insightful analysis of this issue,
see Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can’t Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2005).
49 "Coalesce" is meant here in its proper etymological sense, as cum alescere
"nourishing, making grow together." The noun "coalescence" denotes a unity
whereby every coalescing element contributes on its own to a common growing.
The Oxford Dictionary reports some enlightening uses of this verb, such as: to
give birth to a new stance ("the Conquerors and Conquered coalesced into one
and the same People," anon. 1692), to lift to a superior unity ("[t]o find the
truth in which Religion and Science coalesce," Spencer 1862), to blend elements
which tend to confuse ("both of them should coalesce into one person, but without
confounding them together," Goodwin 1679), and even to unite in a manner that
sorts out confusion (to coalesce "the apparent bulk of the nation in one common
interest"; anon. 1790). See the entry for "Coalesce": Coalesce, in OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 46.
50 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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The term coalescence appears particularly suitable to denote a human
togetherness where the furtherance of truth is the primary end. It differs
from other neighboring terms such as "community" or "society," where
what is at stake is the need for dealing with each other or the necessity
to engage in a reciprocal exchange of "personal" self-expressions.51 In
coalescence, by contrast, men are bound only by the fact that they share a
common responsibility towards truth itself.
This form of togetherness has three traits that must be considered. First,
coalescence denotes a mode of human existence which belongs to men as
such, independently of whether each person is actually together with others
or not. So, an act of speaking publicly in one’s own name is per se a
coalescing act, prior to reaching the public in any effective way. Through
publication, the author’s own word becomes properly what already is ab
origine, namely a word addressed to other human beings aimed at the
elucidation of truth.
Second, coalescence is a togetherness where everyone is expected to
"carry his own weight." As a matter of fact, thinking is one of the few
"activities" that no man can outsource, so to speak, to others.52 In our
discourse, this fact is intimately related to the requirement that an act of public
address must be in one’s own name in order to be the proper subject matter of
copyright.53 A thinking coalescence arises only when a speech in one’s own
name encounters an audience which is, in turn, in someone’s own name.54
Third, coalescence is such that it generates other coalescences. Any public
address is likely to engender further public addresses. As a matter of fact, the
51 On the concept of "society," Hannah Arendt observes that it underlies a conception
of humanity which is fundamentally not free. The Latin word societas (which has
no equivalence in the Greek world) indicated an alliance or an agreement finalized
to a given end, such as the government (societas regni), crime (societas sceleris)
or commerce (simply societas). It was not until the modern age that the adjective
"social" started denoting the human condition as such. HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 23 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 1998) (1958).
52 Kant addresses this issue in the essay What Is Enlightenment?, where he presents as
a maxim of a humankind in a "state of tutelage" the following sentence: "I need not
think, if I can only pay; others will easily take this tedious job over for me." Kant,
supra note 30, at 33. In a way, what we nowadays call the "information society" is
the organization on a global scale of a permanent nonstop process of outsourcing of
thinking. (For a critical discussion see Borghi, supra note 30.)
53 See sources cited supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
54 For each act of speaking in one’s own name there is a corresponding act of
listening and replying in one’s own name. Hence what Abraham Drassinower terms
a "dialogue." Drassinower, supra note 1.
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act of speaking publicly in one’s own name not only does not prevent, but
actually encourages others to speak in their own name on the same subject.55
Truth is never obtained once and for all. Even the most enlightening truth is
fated to be outweighed by untruth if it is no longer furthered and clarified.56
Thus no act of thinking can be conclusive, and truth can never become a
property of a single instance — be it of a single human being or a plurality
thereof, such as a majority.57 Coalescence is a human togetherness where the
furtherance of truth has unconditional priority over the ownership thereof.
We may conclude that copyright is neither (just) about "the author" as such
nor (just) about "the public" as such, but is primarily about the author-public
coalescence. The copyright sphere is the thinking coalescence that each act
of speaking publicly in one’s own name generates.
This insight may permit us to distinguish the specific nature of copyright.
To do this, the next step is to undertake a summary comparison between
copyright and the two rights that have traditionally been associated with it,
namely patents and trademarks.
III. COPYRIGHT AND ITS "FELLOW RIGHTS" — PATENTS AND
TRADEMARKS
Copyright, patents and trademarks are commonly lumped under the umbrella
term intellectual property rights. It is also common, at least in legal
scholarship, to dislike such an amalgamation and to consider it objectionable
in many respects. Many scholars would agree with the following statement
of Richard Stallman: "[I]f you want to think clearly about the issues raised
by patents, or copyrights, or trademarks, the first step is to forget the idea of
lumping them together, and treat them as separate topics."58
It is well known that the construct intellectual property, although old
enough to be deserving of a right of citizenship in the legal vocabulary,59
was not used as a general tag for the said triad until very recently.60Moreover, it
55 The doctrine of fair dealing for purposes of criticism or review is based on this trait
of the coalescence. Cf. id. at 1004-05.
56 See source cited supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57 To be sure, truth decided by a majority opinion is an abhorrence.
58 Richard Stallman, Did You Say "Intellectual Property"? It’s a Seductive Mirage,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
59 Cf. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1999).
60 The construct did not enter popular usage until the late 1960s, after the foundation
of WIPO. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
2010] Copyright and Truth 21
can be observed that the subject of copyright has less to do with that of patents
or trademarks than with other areas of law. Should one conclude that gathering
copyright, patents and trademarks into a single category is purely arbitrary; or
(which is the same) that it is merely the result of historical contingency?
To answer this question we must carefully distinguish two issues that tend
to be confused, with fatal consequences. The one is the ground, if any, for
considering copyright, patents and trademarks as parts of a common body
of law. The other is whether such an alleged commonality is sufficiently
grasped by the notion of intellectual property. These two issues are in fact
distinct: it might be the case that copyright, patents and trademarks do
actually share a common ground, but that such a common ground does not
— or does not primarily — consist in the fact that these are all property-like
rights upon certain given "intellectual" (i.e., non-physical) entities. In other
words, copyright, patents and trademarks may have in common a more
substantial trait than that which is designated by the passe-partout notion of
intellectual property.
In the following I argue that these three rights do actually share a common
ground, and hence the grouping of copyright, patents and trademarks into a
triad is not arbitrary or merely contingent. At the same time, however, the
designation of the triad as intellectual property is of no guidance in such an
analysis, and it is possibly inappropriate.
There is no doubt that the concept of "property" itself would go against
the grain of the coalescing character of copyright, such as we have tried
to establish it so far.61 Yet the problem with the term "intellectual property"
lies more in the former element of the construct (intellectual) than in the —
more famous — latter (property).62 The idea that a category of rights can be
construedon thebasisof their relyingon,andconsistingof, anallegedlyhuman
"mental" activity, embracing any kind of operation — such as creating an
original expression, disclosing a new and non-obvious idea and representing
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033 n.4 (2005). For the use of "intellectual property" in British
jurisprudence see David Vaver, Intellectual Property: The State of the Art, 116 LAW
Q. REV. 621 (2000).
61 This does not mean that dealing with copyright subject matter as a form of property
is to be excluded in principle, but only that this dealing does not correspond
with the sense of copyright proposed here. As we shall see, infra notes 61-68
and accompanying text, both patents and trademarks have a coalescing character,
although of different meaning and scope than that of copyright.
62 Not surprisingly, criticisms of the "intellectual property" construct focus almost
exclusively on the idea of property. See, e.g., RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING
COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 139-43 (2006).
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a distinctive identity — is particularly misleading. The all-embracing idea of
"intellectual" activity as such is misleading, since it leads to confusion. The
specificity of copyright is fated to be obliterated.
The trait that copyright shares with patents and trademarks is a specific
relation to truth. In what follows, I shall develop this point only to a limited
extent, in order to help clarify the specificity of copyright.63
A. Copyright and Patents
In Section II.B. we characterized copyright as the right that protects a
thinking coalescence, i.e., a human togetherness aimed at truth. The word
"reliance" has provided us with a clearer understanding of what truth is. In
particular, we have noticed that truth needs (a coalescing) mankind in order
to be, and that truth simply does not subsist failing a thinking coalescence.
In this understanding, copyright is a peculiar manner of being in the truth,
a manner whereby truth itself is explicitly taken as an issue or, better, the
issue. This occurs in many ways and not only when the author openly puts
a rational or factual truth into question. The act itself of speaking publicly
in one’s own name is a "coalescing act," whereby the author, so to speak,
submits his own words to a thinking coalescence.
Yet this is a specific manner of being in the truth. Not all likely ways
of being in the truth are such that truth itself is taken as the issue. What
characterizes a thinking coalescence is precisely the fact of being in the
truth in a manner that takes truth as (the main) issue. A thinking coalescence
occurs whenever the elucidation of truth is the primary end, in all the ways in
which this elucidation can be furthered: inquiring, questioning, challenging,
grounding, drawing attention to, and so forth. It is a being in the truth for
truth’s sake.
Now, being in the truth for truth’s sake is not the only manner in which
men are in the truth. On the contrary, it is relatively rare. Truth rarely needs
63 Drassinower has provided many insights for the summary analysis which I develop
in what follows. Although Drassinower doesn’t focus on the relation to truth as
the key element in the comparison between the three rights, he identifies each of
them as expressing primarily a relation, namely, a relation "between persons and
objects" in the case of patents and an "interpersonal relation" in the case of both
trademarks and copyright. While with trademarks the relation implies a "unilateral
communication," in the case of copyright the relation takes the full shape of a
dialogue. In Drassinower’s reading, the specificity of copyright stems from the very
nature of its subject matter as public address. Drassinower, supra note 8.
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to be explicitly interrogated. In the normal course of life, men simply rely
on truth without taking it as an issue.
Since truth is "the ground on which we stand,"64 the most common attitude
towards truth is simply to rely on it. What is at stake in such reliance is not
truth as such, but rather the fact that truth enables men to rely and build upon
it. Relation to other human beings is still pivotal to this way of being in the
truth, but this relation is now mediated by relations to things, namely artifacts.
Here the relation to truth consists of interpreting a given reliance, rather
than questioning that reliance. When a new manner of interpreting a given
reliance comes to light, then we have what is commonly called an invention.
Thus there is a possible relationship between the subject matter of
copyright and that of patent. While the subject matter of copyright is an act
of public address for truth’s sake, the subject matter of patent is an act of
interpreting a given truth. A patent, as a public document, is also a speech
addressed to the public. However, in the case of patents the coalescence that
arises through the speaker-addressee relation is not directly achieved by the
fact itself of addressing an issue publicly — as in the case of copyright. Here
the coalescence is engendered by virtue of a common reference to what is
being disclosed in the public address, that is to say, in the patent. A patent
is not primarily an (original) author’s own word aimed at truth as such, but
a (new and unobvious) way of interpreting a given reliance. It is the novelty
and non-obviousness of this interpretative act that justifies a temporary right
to exclude other coalescing parties from the use of the act which is disclosed
to them. Two points should be mentioned.
First, in order to have an invention (and hence a patent) a reliance must
be given previously. In more classical terms: given a technical problem, the
invention discloses a (new and non-obvious) way to solve it. The invention
is a disclosure of a manner to solve a given problem. It does not disclose a
problem as such.
Second, and consequently, the patent as a written document is a speech to
the public in the inventor’s own name.65 Here, however, the inventor-public
relationship is not — at least not primarily — a thinking coalescence. Instead
it is a working coalescence. What is relevant here is to work the invention,
as a peculiar manner of interpreting a given reliance, and not to think the
reliance as such.66
64 See ARENDT, supra note 36, at 259.
65 On patent as public discourse, see Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing
Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1132 (2006).
66 This point is made clear, for instance, by the fact that the patent’s addressee is always
24 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 12:1
B. Copyright and Trademark
Among the so-called intellectual property rights, trademark is perhaps the
one to which the attribute of "property" is least pertinent.67
The proper subject matter of a trademark is neither primarily an act of
speaking publicly in one’s own name nor an act of disclosing a manner of
interpreting a given reliance. What is relevant with a trademark is neither that
something is publicly addressed, nor what is being addressed. Trademark is
concerned only with the fact that "it" is being addressed by someone, and not
by others. Trademark has to do with pure selves, or, in classical terms, with
"distinctive identities," where the distinctiveness stands for the capacity of
distinguishing a thing (good or product) from other things. Distinctiveness
is the aptitude of an identity to be a true identity, namely: to be itself and
not anything else.68 What is relevant is the likelihood of differentiating "it"
from others, no matter how such difference is obtained. Here, again, we have
a relation to others which is mediated by things, where things however are
not seen primarily as objects to work with (as in patents), but rather as goods
to trade with. In such trading, the primary concern is to differentiate one’s
identity from the others’, one "self" from all other selves. The relation to
selves is prior to any relation to others through things. Thus, in trademark
as well there is a coalescing character, insofar as a trademark is addressed
to a trading coalescence.69
A trading coalescence needs to rely on a given reliance too, for instance
in the form of goodwill attached to a self. What is needed here is that
this reliance should be distinguishable as such, and to this end it must be
represented by visible signs. A trademark is a representation of a given
reliance.
a skilled addressee, and this means: a human being in his capacity of interpreting
reliance, and namely a given specific reliance (skilled in the art).
67 See Lionel Bently, Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects to the
Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY:
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 3 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis
eds., 2008).
68 The classical trademark test for distinctiveness is the likelihood of confusion.
69 The English noun and verb "trade" is much richer than the common association
with "buying and selling" would suggest. "Trade" is cognate with "tread" and has
originally the sense of "to tread a path." A "trade" is a path, a track, a course of
action: one’s own habitual way of being — hence the sense of one’s own business.
Compare the entries for "Trade": Trade, in Online Etymology Dictionary, supra
note 46 (search "Trade"; then follow hyperlink) and Trade, in OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY supra note 46.
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* * *
To summarize, in all three "fellow rights" there is a reference to truth, which
implies a coalescing character. However, the relation to truth has a different
tone in each of the three elements of the triad:70
Copyright → relation to others → furthering and maintaining
(thinking coalescence) (elucidating) truth
Patent → relation to things → relying on truth
(working coalescence)
Trademark → relation to selves → representing truth
(trading coalescence)
IV. CONCLUSION: PROVISIONAL REMARKS ON THE PRIMACY OF
COPYRIGHT
Truth as reliance is an instance at stake in all the three main directions of
human existence that we have singled out, namely towards oneself, towards
things, and towards other human beings. The whole of these three directions
is what we call a world.71 When we relate to things we rely on reliance; when
we relate to ourselves we need to represent reliance; and when we relate to
others we elucidate reliance.72 In all these relations, and not only in the last
one, man is coalescing with other men. The tone of this human coalescence is
different in each of the three kinds of relation, and accordingly we find what
70 Further extensive analysis would be needed to address the issue of how the coalescing
character of copyright, patents and trademarks determines their respective scope,
and why, for instance, a working coalescence entails a set of rights which is different
in rationale and scope from that which is required by a thinking coalescence.
71 On this issue, which cannot be developed here, see ARENDT, supra note 51, at
167-74.
72 Certainly, these relations are in turn intimately related to one another. One cannot
relate to other human beings without, at the same time, relating to oneself and to
things "in between" oneself and others. For instance, when an author addresses a
speech to the public, the resulting coalescence must necessarily include a relation
to "what" is being addressed in the speech (thing) and to "who" is addressing the
speech (self). The distinction between the three kinds of relations, or directions
of human existence, is purely analytical. Therefore we can say that copyright is
primarily (but not exclusively) about relation to others, but the same cannot be said
for patent and trademark with respect to things and selves.
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we have termed a working, trading and thinking coalescence, respectively.
All these forms are related to each other, and they are equal in rank.
Nevertheless, the thinking coalescence, which articulates the relation of
human existence to others, has a singular preeminence over the two other
coalescences and their respective underlying relations. In a way, truth is
first and foremost what men experience in thinking, and since, as has
been shown, it belongs to the very nature of thinking to be carried out in
common with others, it follows that truth is primarily apprehended by acts
of speaking publicly in one’s own name. Such preeminence is not a priority
in the sense that the other ways of experiencing truth depend on or are
subordinated to acts of thinking. As a matter of fact, affairs of men, their
working and trading, can run perfectly without the assistance of thinking.
What thinking provides is just a gratuitous and perhaps unnecessary pivot.
To use a pertinent Latin expression, we may say that what we have termed
a "thinking coalescence" is a primum inter pares in the triad of human
coalescences: it is primum, since it is pivotal to any human coalescence as
such, but inter pares, since all other forms have equal rank and dignity.
Accordingly, copyright is primum among its peer fellow rights. Nowhere
is this preeminence clearer than in the institutions that define the permitted
acts under copyright law, namely limitations and exceptions, the British
doctrine of fair dealing and its American counterpart, fair use.73 It is disputed
whether these institutions should be interpreted as restrictions to the author’s
rights, that can be applied only negatively as a defense against infringement
liability, or whether they define true and proper users’ rights, that can be
positively asserted by any author’s counterpart.74 The reference to the truth
as the proper "what-about" of copyright may suggest that copyright is neither
author’s nor users’, but just, if I may say so, coalescence’s right. As far as
the fair dealing defense is concerned, it might be argued that the "fairness"
is nothing but the perfection of reciprocal acts aimed at furthering truth —
73 In a broader sense, permitted acts are also defined by institutions such as the
idea/expression dichotomy, the "substantial part" requirement, the private copying
limitation, the rule of exhaustion (or "first sale" doctrine) and the limited time of
protection. All these institutions — whose analysis lies beyond the scope of this
Article — have been developed over time from a single concept, namely defining
the boundaries of infringement liability. For an overview, see Melissa De Zwart,
A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing and Fair Use: Lessons for the
Digital Age, 1 INT’L. PROP. Q. 60 (2007).
74 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USER’S RIGHTS (1991); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1999).
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acts which, so to speak, resonate with and enlighten each other, since it is
in the very nature of copyright to withstand coalescence.
